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A
ttending physicians, regardless 
of their specialty or setting 
of practice, may suspect or 
learn that their patient has been 
attacked with a biological agent. 
In such cases, it is important to be 
aware of the interactions that may 
occur with law enforcement, and of 
the role that the evolving science of 
microbial forensics [1] may play in 
the investigation. Physicians are in key 
positions to preserve critical evidence 
and, thereby, contribute to the chain 
of custody, and, at the same time, offer 
suggestions to help develop the ﬁ  eld 
of microbial forensics.
This article provides guidance to 
physicians who believe that one of 
their patients is a victim of an act of 
bioterrorism or of another biocrime, 
and who are compelled by law, or with 
the patient’s consent, wish to assist law 
enforcement in an investigation. In this 
regard, there are instructive lessons 
that can be learned from cases of past 
biocrimes and from analogies to more 
familiar cases of sexual assault and 
child abuse (Table 1). 
Recent Biocrimes
The most widely publicized 
bioterrorism event in the United States 
was the US anthrax mail attacks of 
2001. In this case, an astute physician 
diagnosed the index case of systemic 
anthrax [2] that set off national 
panic and a federal investigation that 
is still ongoing. Highly publicized 
in Europe was the assassination of 
a Bulgarian exile in London using 
ricin, a toxin extracted from castor 
beans, [3,4] which was delivered 
to him using an umbrella. Less 
publicized are other biocrimes such 
as the case of a laboratory worker in 
Texas intentionally infecting hospital 
co-workers with Shigella dysenteriae. 
Biocrimes are much less likely to 
occur than many infectious diseases, 
such as HIV/AIDS. In fact, it is often 
the abundance of naturally occurring 
infections that may make the detection 
of a biocrime difﬁ  cult. However, 
there are also documented cases of 
non-bioterrorism biocrimes (Box 1) 
[5,6], which far exceed the number of 
documented bioterrorism acts, as well 
as many hoaxes where physicians and 
clinical laboratories were involved in 
determining if there was a real threat to 
exposed individuals. 
A biocrime is similar to an assault 
crime, except, instead of a gun 
or knife, the weapon is a pathogen 
or a toxin. In the US, acts of 
bioterrorism are federal crimes 
that are governed by different 
responses by law enforcement and 
public health agencies than those 
that govern other biocrimes [7]. 
Most biocrimes and their subset of 
bioterrorism cases will involve public 
health agencies because of the nature 
of a disease threat to the public. 
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The numerous hoaxes that are 
biocrimes include white powders found 
in letters that proclaim the presence 
of anthrax, and threatening notes 
claiming ricin contamination of baby 
food. Ricin currently appears to be a 
prevalent bioweapon, particularly as 
a tool for extortion. These potential 
ricin threats demonstrate the impact of 
bioterrorism on patient care: physicians 
had to monitor patients who might 
have ingested the poisoned food and, 
hence, were distracted from caring 
for other patients [8]. Hoaxes can be 
challenging for the physician, who 
must distinguish between symptoms 
and signs that could be toxin-related 
and those that are just variants of 
normal health. This challenge was 
compounded in a recent case where 
there were trace ﬁ  ndings of an 
inactive form of ricin in baby food. 
Nonetheless, a hoax is also a crime, 
and the physician should not discard 
any evidence simply because material 
appears innocuous.
As environmental biothreat sensors 
expand into the workplace and public 
places, they will be relied on as sentinels 
for possible biothreat releases. In the 
US, sensors for anthrax are being placed 
in some postal ofﬁ  ces and at some major 
public events, and air monitoring is 
being carried out in major cities and 
transit systems (the BioWatch system). 
When such sensors indicate a possible 
bioterrorist attack, even if the signal 
is later found to be a false signal, the 
public will react, and are likely to seek 
out their own physicians for medical 
diagnostics, therapy, and advice. 
Potential cases that follow a public alert 
warrant evaluation, collection of patient 
samples, and possibly institution of 
prophylactic treatments until an alert is 
deemed a false alarm. Such a situation 
occurred in March 2005 following 
a presumptive positive detection of 
anthrax in a US Department of Defense 
mailroom. This situation necessitated 
treating over 900 potential victims with 
antibiotics as a precaution. However, 
despite the newer sensor technologies, 
physicians will likely remain the best and 
deﬁ  nitive authorities on the presence of 
an infection.
Reporting a Biocrime
Patients who believe that they 
have been a victim of a biocrime 
generally want both a medical and 
law enforcement response—that is, 
they want medical treatment, and 
they want the perpetrator to be 
found, prosecuted, and punished. 
Requirements for how physicians and 
other members of the health-care 
system initially report a suspected 
biocrime are governed at the local level 
(but regulations are ever-changing, 
and it is important to check current 
information at the time it is needed). 
Many US state regulations mandate 
that diagnostic laboratories report 
preliminary isolates of certain microbes 
to public health authorities, who, in 
turn, are sometimes compelled to 
notify law enforcement, depending 
on the isolate. Certain states have 
laws that mandate that a physician 
report speciﬁ  c diseases or unusual 
clinical manifestations to public 
health authorities and, in some cases, 
directly to law enforcement. The latter 
requirement is analogous to what 
is expected when there is suspicion 
of child abuse or gunshot wounds, 
and failure to notify authorities is 
itself a crime. The regulations of 
the Health Insurance Portability 
Table 1. Comparison of Biocrimes, Sexual Assaults, and Child Abuse in the US
Variable Biocrime Sexual Assault Child Abuse (Physical, Mental, 
and/or Sexual)
Validated analysis kit available None currently available.  Sexual assault analysis kit is available. It 
is oriented at collection of semen, saliva, 
sperm, hair, ﬁ  ngernails, and skin, which 
in general are amenable to the same 
preservation process of sample evidence. 
Chain-of-custody protocols are outlined 
with kit. 
Depends on the amount of time since 
last incident with victim. Documentation 
by photography and imaging might be 
considered.
Time factors and limits Time may be of the essence to recover 
isolate closest to inoculum, in case of a 
microbe, or greatest quantity of toxin. 
Viable motile sperm may no longer be 
found after eight hours in general; found 
up to two to three days in cervical mucosa; 
nonmotile sperm (very limited in number) 
found up to 17 days in cervical mucosa. 
Delays may occur as victim does not 
understand, is fearful, or is powerless to 
report incident. Perpetrators may interfere, 
as they do not want to have the act 
discovered. 
Established standardized training 
courses available
None available for medical personnel. Multiple courses available. Multiple courses available.
Privacy issues Yes Yes Yes
Primary forensic evidence Laboratory diagnostics, including 
identiﬁ  cation of etiologic agent: causative 
microorganisms and their nucleic acids, 
additives, and stabilizers. 
Human DNA, hair, saliva, skin, and 
spermatozoa.
Photographic documentation and 
possible physical evidence.
Potential factors for compromise 
of forensic evidence
Decontamination processes of bathing, 
personal hygiene, and household cleaning 
may destroy primary microbial material 
and extra material evidence (throwing out 
envelopes, cleaning surfaces, or washing 
clothes). Contamination with other 
microbes, and preculture therapy with 
antibiotics.
Bathing, personal hygiene, and household 
cleaning may destroy material evidence 
(semen, hair, skin, and saliva, which 
contain DNA and other markers, and 
ﬁ  bers; destruction of evidence by washing 
clothes, bedding, or carpet). Other sexual 
contacts (consensual) in immediate time 
before or after assault; and spermicides.
Some of the sexual assault factors apply 
here.
It is recommended that current individual state requirements be consulted at the time of a particular occurrence. 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020337.t001
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and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996 established national standards 
for health-care transactions as well 
as security and privacy policy for 
health-related information, and 
physicians should be aware of these 
standards. However, even though these 
regulations severely restrict the release 
of patient health–related information, 
they still permit physicians and health-
care facilities to release otherwise 
protected health information in 
instances of suspected crimes or threats 
to public health [9,10]. 
Given the limited guidance for 
reporting suspected biocrimes, 
physicians could face several dilemmas. 
For example, some patients may not 
want to report a crime or a disease 
condition, yet may have reasonable 
concerns. At the beginning of the HIV/
AIDS epidemic, when no treatment 
was available, a diagnosis of HIV 
infection caused many patients to fear 
discrimination and loss of employment, 
a situation that persists in many parts of 
the world. Similar questions may arise 
in bioterrorism events about insurance 
coverage if an event is deemed an 
act of war. Communication between 
physician and patient should help 
the patient understand the pros and 
cons of notifying law enforcement 
of a suspected biocrime, including 
whether withholding notiﬁ  cation could 
place others at risk. At the very least, 
discussion can strengthen the doctor–
patient relationship.
Fear and embarrassment of 
reporting potential false alarms to 
law enforcement or public health 
authorities may also be a concern 
for physicians and patients. But if a 
suspicion is not reported, a critical 
situation may go unrecognized and 
continue to worsen. Early notiﬁ  cation 
to law enforcement authorities may 
provide valuable time and direction 
for investigative leads. It is expected 
that there will be many more negatives 
(false alarms) than positives when 
alerting law enforcement. Early 
reports to public health authorities 
may stem an epidemic. It is a 
misconception that you must wait for 
a ﬁ  rm diagnosis before reporting a 
potential case to authorities. There 
are many other misconceptions about 
biocrimes (Table 2).
Guidance in the US concerning 
the reporting of suspicions of 
biocrimes is provided by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC; http:⁄⁄www.cdc.gov), the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI; http:⁄⁄www.fbi.gov), and the 
Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS; http:⁄⁄www.dhs.gov) (Table 
2). A joint statement by the FBI, the 
CDC, and the DHS advises calling the 
FBI and public health authorities if a 
suspicious situation arises [11]. Local 
public health departments are advised 
to notify the FBI before notifying 
the CDC. Speciﬁ  cally, “the FBI must 
be notiﬁ  ed for any case of smallpox 
or pulmonary anthrax, uncommon 
agent or disease, an illness caused by a 
microorganism with markedly atypical 
features, an illness due to aerosol or 
food or water sabotage, as opposed 
to a usual transmission route, one or 
more clusters of illnesses that remain 
unexplained after a preliminary 
investigation; deliberate chemical, 
industrial, radiation or nuclear release” 
[12]. Calls or online tips should be 
directed to the FBI (https:⁄⁄tips.fbi.
gov). Interpol and the World Health 
Organization are also developing 
response plans to help the public 
and physicians respond to suspected 
biocrimes and acts of bioterrorism 
(http:⁄⁄www.who.int/topics/
bioterrorism/en). 
The Physician’s Role in Collecting 
Evidence 
Although ﬁ  nding the perpetrator of a 
crime is a law enforcement function, 
the actions of attending physicians 
can help with microbial forensics—the 
scientiﬁ  c discipline dedicated to 
analyzing evidence from a biocrime or 
an act of bioterrorism, and that seeks 
to authenticate a piece of the puzzle 
for attribution. Implicit in the term 
attribution is the identiﬁ  cation of the 
responsible party or the exclusion of 
the innocent [13]. 
Many physicians are familiar with 
the treatment of sexual assault victims, 
and the need to collect and preserve 
evidence when the patient consents. 
Sexual assault analysis kits have been 
validated to preserve semen, saliva, 
hair, blood, and skin. They also provide 
instructions on how to maintain a chain 
of custody to ensure that there has 
been no tampering with the evidence. 
Chain of custody is the process that 
assures integrity of the evidence, and 
ensures that there is documentation of 
the time the evidence is handled and 
each individual handling or examining 
the evidence. Courses exist in crime 
scene investigation, evidence collection, 
and chain of custody of the evidence 
in suspected sexual assault cases, and 
there are often well-trained support 
personnel who can assist patients and 
physicians. Such evidence collection 
guidance and support structures are 
not well-developed for biocrimes. 
In contrast to typical human DNA 
forensic investigations, with microbial 
forensics, a chain of custody might 
not be enacted at the initial stage of 
medical diagnostics. Good diagnostic 
practices could permit samples to 
be used as supporting evidence in a 
criminal investigation. In some cases, 
samples can be obtained subsequently 
under a stricter chain-of-custody 
process. Law enforcement authorities 
can assist with such documentation 
processes. 
Microbial Forensics 
Microbial forensics includes the full 
scope of forensic evidence, such as 
analyses of microbes, materials used 
to prepare, stabilize, and deliver the 
toxin or pathogen, and ﬁ  ngerprints, 
hair, ﬁ  ber, and pollen [1,14]. The 
laboratory analyses used for microbial 
forensics may include molecular 
sequencing, microbiological cultures, 
biochemistry, electron microscopy, 
crystallography, and mass spectrometry. 
These analyses go well beyond those 
used for medical diagnoses and 
epidemiologic investigations [15]. They 
require, however, the same substances 
used by the physician for diagnostics, 
for example, body ﬂ  uid samples and 
microbial cultures. In this regard, the 
physician and the clinical laboratory 
have critical roles in the collection and 
initial analyses of samples for microbial 
forensics. 
In the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, 
the preservation of the initial and 
Box 1. Examples of 
Non-Bioterror Biocrimes 
• Intentional Salmonella typhi food 
contamination in France from 1910 
to1918
• A Yersinia pestis attack by injection in 
1933 in India 
• Deliberate use of HIV-infected blood 
and secretions to inﬂ  ict harm
Source: [5,6].
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subsequent isolates enabled microbial 
forensic methods to identify the strain 
in the attacks as the Ames strain of 
Bacillus anthracis. Analyses were based 
initially on a method to identify 
variable-number tandem repeat 
sequences, and later on, whole genome 
sequencing. Comparisons with existing 
strains in culture collections narrowed 
the likely source to a laboratory as 
opposed to being obtained directly 
from nature [16–18]. Fortunately, the 
initial strain from the Florida patient 
(the index case) and strains isolated 
from other victims, as well as spores 
from the letters, were preserved for 
future analyses. Microbial forensic 
analysis is now able, with the help 
of specialized facilities such as the 
Institute for Genome Research (TIGR), 
to determine the whole genome 
sequence of the approximately 5 
million bases of B. anthracis to identify 
the polymorphisms that may be 
signatures of the bioweapon [17]. 
A major thrust of microbial forensics 
will, therefore, be the analysis of 
nucleic acids that can relate the 
genome of the pathogen to speciﬁ  c 
sources. This analysis is analogous to 
human DNA forensic analysis, which 
is being widely used to prosecute 
criminals and to exonerate the 
innocent [19]. But there are important 
differences between the analyses of 
microbial genomes and those used 
in human DNA forensics. Because 
of the sheer number of potential 
pathogens that could be employed as 
a weapon, identifying genetic markers 
for microbes is a more daunting task 
than identifying human DNA. In the 
case of human identiﬁ  cation, only 
one species is involved, and it is often 
possible to identify an individual 
person. Viruses and most bacteria 
are haploid. Microbes primarily 
reproduce asexually, but can also 
evolve by recombination, horizontal 
gene transfer, and gene duplication. 
Therefore, statistical methodologies 
and interpretation will require 
different tools than are currently used 
for comparing and estimating the 
rarity of (diploid) human DNA proﬁ  les 
[20,21]. Nevertheless, obstacles due to 
genetic complexity can be reduced by 
obtaining samples as early as possible.
If physicians suspect a biocrime, 
they should take steps to ensure the 
preservation of the diagnostic samples 
so that they are not prematurely 
destroyed. Physicians may also advise 
the patient to preserve additional 
material that may prove useful for a 
criminal investigation. Just as in sexual 
assaults, in a suspected biocrime, the 
patient’s personal articles may carry 
traditional forensic evidence that 
is of equal value to the information 
revealed by the microbe itself. 
Unlike sexual assault evidence, in a 
suspected biocrime, procedures used 
to preserve one particular microbe 
may be deleterious for other microbes 
and for physical evidence (such as 
ﬁ  ngerprints, culture media, isotopes, 
hair, and environmental material). 
Table 2. Possible Misconceptions about Biocrimes in the US
Misconception Reality
In instances of suspected 
biocrimes, the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies do not 
want to be notiﬁ  ed until the 
diagnosis is conﬁ  rmed.
The FBI and CDC Web sites both encourage notiﬁ  cation. The FBI provides for 
online notiﬁ  cation, and suggests contacting the local FBI ofﬁ  ce (information 
on Web and phone directories). A document issued jointly by the FBI, DHS, 
and US Department of Health and Human Services/CDC gives guidance on 
how to respond to a suspicious letter or container with a potential biological 
threat (see [11]). The CDC requests that all incidents of apparent or threatened 
bioterrorism be voluntarily reported to the CDC by state public health ofﬁ  cials, 
immediately following notiﬁ  cation of the FBI and local law enforcement 
agencies. State health ofﬁ  cials should call the 24-hour notiﬁ  cation telephone 
number ([770] 488-7100) at the CDC Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Branch. For general inquires to CDC telephone 1-800-CDC-INFO. Even with 
simple suspicious packages, FBI instructions for biological or chemical 
materials are to isolate—don’t handle. Call 911 (Police).
Physicians must be hypervigilant 
to make a diagnosis or develop 
a differential diagnosis in which 
a biocrime is included, especially 
during the initial encounter.
Symptoms and signs from a covert attack with a biological agent will often 
not be distinct during the immediate encounter in a busy emergency room or 
ofﬁ  ce visit. Suspicion increases after initial symptoms, when signs evolve with 
time or a laboratory report raises suspicions of an unusual infection for the 
geographic area or season. The patient may be admitted to the hospital under 
a different doctor’s care or discharged. News reports may raise suspicions, and 
reports of isolated cases to the public health authorities may reach a threshold 
to alert suspicion (advantage of notifying health department early). In the case 
of an overt attack or threat, e.g, a powder in a letter, or a threat note (also a 
federal crime with a hoax), the situation is analogous to a sexual assault victim 
who wishes to report a crime—action is mandatory. Both law enforcement 
and public health authorities need to be informed simultaneously, according 
to state law.
It is likely to be the infectious 
disease specialist or emergency 
room physician, trained to 
recognize manifestations caused 
by microbes, who will make the 
diagnosis.
Depending on the organ system involved, the patient may present to a 
different specialist. Some victims from the anthrax mail attacks presented to 
dermatologists for cutaneous lesions. 
If you do not recognize the 
possibility that the patient is a 
victim of a biocrime, it is too late 
to obtain evidence that will be 
useful to determine who was 
responsible or that will hold up 
in court.
Although early recognition and early collection of evidence samples are best, 
collection of evidence at any stage may still have important probative value. 
As an infection evolves, the responsible microbe can be recovered.
You could be violating 
the patient’s privacy and 
conﬁ  dentiality.
State laws govern when the physician or the laboratory must report a disease, 
set of symptoms, or microbial isolate irrespective of patient consent. In 
instances where public health or national security is threatened or a crime 
is suspected, regulations of the HIPAA permit the release of certain private 
information to law enforcement or public health authorities when requested. 
In most cases of a biocrime, informed patients will likely be eager to cooperate. 
Thus, it will be less likely that a doctor must struggle with conﬁ  dentiality and 
public welfare or legal obligations.
A patient who will not consent 
to notiﬁ  cation of public health 
or law enforcement authorities is 
concealing criminal activities.
A patient may have legitimate concerns that they could be denied insurance 
coverage, stigmatized, or denied career advancement. This is analogous 
to fears about being diagnosed as HIV positive at the beginning of the US 
epidemic. Occupational accident resulting in exposure to a biological agent 
may raise issue of carelessness.
HIPAA, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020337.t002
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In addition, procedures useful for 
preserving one microbe may be 
insufﬁ  cient to preserve another that 
may be unknown at the time. 
History and Physical Examination 
The physician’s record of the patient’s 
history and physical examination is 
evidence that can be expected to be 
part of any public health and forensic 
investigation (and subsequent legal 
proceedings) in either a true attack 
or a hoax. The physician’s ability 
to interpret the clinical history and 
physical examination may go beyond 
differential diagnoses—for example, it 
can help establish timelines of exposure 
and of the evolution of disease, 
which will have forensic and public 
health implications. The physician is 
positioned to assist in identiﬁ  cation 
and collection of evidence, and initiate 
the chain of custody that protects 
the integrity of the evidence (see 
supporting online material of [1]; 
[14,22]) or, at a minimum, maintains 
good medical practice, akin to that 
used for transfusion of blood products. 
The Case of Louisiana v. Schmidt
The case of Louisiana v. Schmidt, in 
which HIV-infected blood was used as 
the weapon in an attempted murder 
[23,24], is instructive for the microbial 
forensics system. A vial of HIV-infected 
blood was found in the ofﬁ  ce of a 
suspect, a gastroenterologist. The 
challenge for microbial forensics was 
to provide evidence that this was, or 
was not, the source of the victim’s 
HIV infection. HIV, an RNA virus, 
undergoes rapid mutation, so any 
direct genetic comparison of the 
donor source and the recipient (the 
victim) is complicated. In this case, 
analysis focusing on both rapidly and 
more slowly mutating genes of HIV 
proved to be useful. Examination of 
strains from the vial, the victim, and 
control samples (known samples from 
other patients with HIV residing in 
the same geographic region as the 
victim) revealed that the viral RNA 
from the victim was more closely 
aligned to that from the vial in the 
suspect’s ofﬁ  ce than to isolates from 
other patients in the area. The clinical 
history and clinical laboratory data 
obtained by attending physicians 
provided supporting evidence of the 
uninfected status of the victim prior 
to this injection. The victim’s prior 
HIV-negative status was documented 
by blood donation screenings and 
negative-HIV tests of sexual partners, 
prior to the injection. The evidence 
was presented in a US criminal court. 
Based on the composite epidemiologic 
and microbial forensic evidence 
presented, a conviction for attempted 
murder was obtained.
This case illustrates several 
points. Sample collection and 
documentation by the attending 
physician are paramount to the 
biocrime investigation. If an attending 
physician is suspicious about an 
acquired infection, especially with 
an organism that is known to mutate 
rapidly, more frequent sampling and 
preservation of those samples are 
important. The sample may contain 
other clues (the victim, in this case, 
also was allegedly injected with 
blood that was hepatitis C positive). 
These samples could be helpful both 
epidemiologically, if there were an 
outbreak, and forensically, if there 
were an intentional incident. Analysis 
of these patient samples and other 
specimens may determine who was 
the source, and who was the victim. 
This case showed that even though 
the earliest isolates were not obtained, 
when the possibility of a biocrime was 
considered, there was still sufﬁ  cient 
time to obtain valuable specimens, 
even with this rapidly mutating virus. 
The case also illustrates that microbial 
evidence can be informative, but it 
is rarely the sole deciding evidence. 
When considered in conjunction with 
other evidence—in this situation, 
epidemiological and clinical data—the 
case was very strong. 
Instructive lessons can also be 
found by reviewing other cases in the 
literature [5], such as the laboratory 
technician who poisoned her co-
workers with a laboratory stock of 
Shigella dysenteriae type 2 in mufﬁ  ns 
[25], and the poisoning of salad bars to 
skew an election for political gain [26].
Although our primary focus has 
been on the role that the practicing 
physician can play, it is important to 
remember that medical examiners or 
coroners can also serve as sentinels 
for discovering acts of bioterrorism 
and biocrime, as well as collecting 
pertinent microbial forensic evidence 
[27]. They have the statutory authority 
to investigate deaths that are sudden, 
suspicious, violent, and unattended. 
Moreover, the medical examiner or 
coroner may encounter victims that 
were never examined by practicing 
physicians. Autopsies can be crucial for 
diagnosis of unknown infections and 
for acquiring evidence for subsequent 
criminal investigations [1,19]. For 
example, in 1979, in Sverdlovsk, 
USSR, at least 66 people died during 
an anthrax outbreak. The ofﬁ  cial 
Soviet government position was that 
the victims were infected by eating 
contaminated meat. Autopsy data 
were inconsistent with the proclaimed 
cause of death, and, instead, supported 
the proposition that the disease 
was inhalational anthrax due to an 
accidental aerosol emission from a 
secret military weapons facility [28]. 
Box 2. Measures That a 
Physician May Take toward 
Securing Evidence in Cases 
of Biocrimes
• Maintain primary role in caring for the 
patient, even at the risk of compromising 
evidence collection. 
• Discuss the situation with the patient, 
including options for interaction with 
and disclosure to public health and law 
enforcement ofﬁ  cials. 
• If permitted by patient consent, or 
if required by law, alert as early as 
possible public health authorities and 
law enforcement, who can provide the 
necessary expertise or guidance to 
collect and preserve evidence. 
• Do not assume one agency will notify 
the other in a time-sensitive period. 
Ensure that notiﬁ  cation has occurred.
• Maintain well-documented medical 
records because documentation of 
history, physical examination, and patient 
course may constitute evidence. 
• Obtain samples that may serve as 
evidence early, frequently, and under a 
deﬁ  ned chain-of-custody process.
• Once a biocrime is suspected, ensure 
that the clinical laboratory does not 
discard microbial isolates, but preserves 
them for forensic analyses or transfers 
them under a chain-of-custody 
procedure (along with accessory material 
such as the transport tube initially used 
to transport microbial isolates from 
patient to laboratory). Law enforcement 
and public health personnel participating 
in the Laboratory Response Network can 
provide this assistance.
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Close working relationships should 
be developed between the medical 
examiner/coroner and public health 
and law enforcement entities to alert 
one another of possible outbreaks 
(whether natural or intentional) as 
soon as possible. For suspected attacks, 
the medical examiner/coroner should 
immediately collect case-speciﬁ  c death 
investigation information and establish 
a chain of custody. Fortunately, 
medical examiners and coroners have 
a long-established relationship with 
law enforcement. However, if there 
are questions regarding notiﬁ  cation 
or evidence collection, the medical 
examiner/coroner can contact 
the proper public health and law 
enforcement entities (see Table 2). 
Conclusions
Physicians and other health-care 
providers are positioned to recognize 
suspicious situations and alert public 
health and law enforcement ofﬁ  cials. 
This alone may be the most important 
step physicians can take (Box 2). 
In cases of biocrimes, physicians may 
interact with nonmedical authorities—
who often do not fully appreciate that 
a trusting doctor    –patient relationship 
is crucial for proper care and healing, 
and that information should be 
private. It is helpful to inform such 
ofﬁ  cials about the importance of 
the doctor–patient relationship at 
the outset so they can be sensitive to 
the obligations of physicians. Just as 
with a sexual assault case, once there 
is recognition of the possibility of a 
bioterrorism act or other biocrime, 
the physician should discuss the entire 
situation with the patient, explaining 
what can be done with the consent of 
the patient and what actions physicians 
are mandated to take to comply with 
public health and legal requirements. 
This communication will likely 
strengthen the patient’s relationship 
with the physician. Within the context 
of microbial forensics, if the patient 
consents, or the law requires it, the 
physician can facilitate preservation 
of evidence. To the extent possible, 
earlier, more, and serial sampling of 
evidence is best. 
Physicians can ultimately serve their 
patients by acting, in the traditional 
role, as a healer, and by working with 
public health and law enforcement 
entities to help prevent further attacks 
and to achieve justice. As with sexual 
assaults, identiﬁ  cation and conviction 
of the attacker can bring closure and 
provide a degree of security to the 
patient, who can then evolve from 
being a victim to being a survivor 
[29]. Physicians and their colleagues 
are likely to have creative ideas to 
contribute to the ﬁ  eld of microbial 
forensics. Their input is encouraged 
and welcomed.  
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